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Abstract
Living in large, stable social groups is often considered to favor the evolution of enhanced cognitive 
abilities, such as recognizing group members, tracking their social status and inferring relationships 
among them.1–4 An individual’s place in the social order can be learned through direct interactions 
with others, but conflicts can be time-consuming and even injurious. Because the number of possible 
pairwise interactions increases rapidly with group size, members of large social groups will benefit 
if they can make judgments about relationships on the basis of indirect evidence.5 Transitive reason-
ing should therefore be particularly important for social individuals, allowing assessment of relation-
ships from observations of interactions among others. Although a variety of studies have suggested 
that transitive inference may be used in social settings,6–10 the phenomenon has not been demon-
strated under controlled conditions in animals. Here we show that highly social pinyon jays (Gymno-
rhinus cyanocephalus) draw sophisticated inferences about their own dominance status relative to that 
of strangers that they have observed interacting with known individuals. These results directly dem-
onstrate that animals use transitive inference in social settings and imply that such cognitive capabili-
ties are widespread among social species.
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Pinyon jays are among the most social of North American 
corvids. They live in large permanent flocks of up to 500 indi-
viduals, breed colonially and establish long-term multigenera-
tional relationships with linear dominance hierarchies.11, 12 In 
operant experiments using colored stimuli, pinyon jays track 
implicitly ordered dyadic relationships more accurately and dis-
play more robust transitive inferences than western scrub jays 
(Aphelocoma californica), a closely related, less social species.13 
This suggests that the differing demands of the social systems in 
the two species may have selected for differential cognitive abil-
ities,14 but there has been no direct evidence that pinyon jays or 
any other non-human species use transitive inference to make 
social judgments.
Sixteen adult male pinyon jays, sexed by DNA analysis, were 
captured in northern Arizona, housed individually and kept 
mildly hungry (at 90% of their free-feeding weight) by controlled 
daily feedings. They were divided into three groups such that, 
although some birds may have known each other from the wild, 
no birds from separate groups had been in direct contact for at 
least five years (see Methods). Within the three groups domi-
nance relationships were established in a series of six 5-minute 
staged encounters between each of the 36 possible pairs of in-
dividuals (Figure 1a). All sessions were recorded on digital vid-
eotape and the frequencies of five behavioral events—one dom-
inant display (stare at) and four submissive ones (look away, 
crouch, chin-up and beg)—were determined for each bird.11, 12
From each encounter session, we extracted two weighted indi-
ces for each bird (one of dominant and one of subordinate behav-
iors) on the basis of the event frequencies. Weights were obtained 
by canonical discriminant analysis on a subset of dyads in which 
the relationships were clear and unequivocal (see Methods). The 
difference between dominant and subordinate behaviors for a 
given individual provided a direct measure of the strength of its 
relative social status (see Methods). Using the average differences 
in relative social status between individuals in all 36 dyads over 
the last three encounters, we constructed inferred within-group 
dominance hierarchies and coded the bird designations accord-
ingly. In all three groups the hierarchies were linear and fully 
transitive (group 1, A > B > C > D > E > F; group 2, 1 > 2 > 3 > 4 > 
5 > 6; and group 3, P > Q > R > S). For 62% of the dyads, relative 
social status was consistent from the first or second encounter. In 
those dyads in which both birds were low-ranking, however, the 
process often took much longer: over 25% of the dyads showed 
transient status reversals as late as the fourth or fifth encounter.
Once within-group dominance relationships had been estab-
lished, we conducted a limited set of cross-group dominance 
encounters between similarly ranked individuals to establish a 
basis for predicting the relationships between other, untested 
cross-group dyads. During the cross-group encounters we 
avoided using birds at the top or bottom of their group hierar-
chies, because the next stage of the experiment (“exhibition” en-
counters, below) required birds that could both win and lose en-
counters with members of their group. There were 32 possible 
cross-group dominance relationships, of which we determined 
eight (see Methods). The information from these cross-group 
pairings plus the knowledge of each within-group hierarchy 
made it possible to establish our experimental and control con-
ditions in the next stage of the experiment.
We designed a set of 12 instances that tested the ability of pin-
yon jays to draw social inferences. In each instance, an observer 
bird watched a series of “exhibition” encounters between another 
bird (the “demonstrator”) and two different  opponents (Figure 
1b, c). Although the observer had never previously interacted 
with the demonstrator, the results of the cross-group dominance 
tests predicted that the demonstrator should dominate the ob-
server. On each of three consecutive days, the observer watched 
 
 
Figure 1. Dominance encounters were conducted in a transparent acrylic 
chamber (100 × 40 × 40 cm) separated into three compartments by sliding 
opaque and transparent dividers. On each trial, a feeder box in the central 
compartment was baited with a single unshelled peanut. a, To establish rela-
tive dominance, all dyads within each of the social groups were tested. Birds 
were placed in each of the two end chambers and were released simultane-
ously to compete over access to the peanut. b, c, Next, exhibition encoun-
ters were observed by a third bird whose prior knowledge of contestants 
was systematically controlled. If bird 3 was in the experimental condition, for 
example, he watched A > B, B > 2 (only 2 known to 3). If bird 3 was in the 
control condition, he watched A > B, B > C (all strangers to 3). d, In either 
case, following these exhibition encounters 3 was tested with B.
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his demonstrator lose encounters with one opponent and win 
encounters with another, giving a total of six exhibition encoun-
ters per observer/demonstrator dyad. In all cases, the outcomes 
of the exhibition encounters coincided with our predictions. This 
sequentially balanced design was employed to ensure the use of 
transitive inference on the basis of observations of encounters 
between specific individuals, rather than simply the general ef-
fects of having seen another animal win or lose.15, 16, 17
In the exhibition encounters, the observer’s prior knowledge 
about one of the demonstrator’s opponents was varied system-
atically. In experimental instances the demonstrator and one op-
ponent were strangers, but the opponent that repeatedly lost to 
the demonstrator was familiar to the observer, because that op-
ponent had dominated the observer in earlier staged encounters. 
For example, suppose that cross-group testing had established 
that B was dominant to 2. We could then use 3 in an experimen-
tal treatment by allowing him to observe that A > B and B > 2 
(Figure 1b). In this case, A and B would be strangers to 3, but the 
relationship 2 > 3 would have been established in earlier within-
group interactions. Using transitive reasoning, 3 should expect 
to be subordinate to B. In contrast, in control instances the dem-
onstrator  and both of his opponents were all strangers to the 
observer. If 3 were assigned to the control condition, he would 
watch A > B and B > C, all unknown to 3 (Figure 1c). Therefore, 
3 could not subsequently use transitive reasoning to predict his 
status relative to B.
Following the exhibition encounters, each observer was given 
six 5-minute staged encounters with his demonstrator (testing, 
in our example, B versus 3; Figure 1d), and the behavior of both 
participants in these test trials was evaluated for evidence of 
transitive social inference. We conducted six sets of experimen-
tal and six sets of control exhibition and test encounters, each 
using different observer/demonstrator dyads (see Methods). 
Because the data violated assumptions of parametric analysis, 
differences between groups were analyzed using Wilcoxon two-
sample exact probability tests.18 Dyads were assigned to treat-
ments in a balanced fashion, such that experimental and control 
dyads had statistically indistinguishable differences in relative 
social status scores (W + = 44, P = 0.48).
If experimental observers use transitive social inference to 
predict their relationship to the demonstrator, they should ex-
hibit higher initial levels of submissive behavior than control ob-
servers. This proved to be the case. During the first minute of the 
first encounter experimental observers displayed subordinance 
levels that were nearly four times as high as those of controls 
(Figure 2a). The effect faded rapidly, however, and there were 
no significant treatment differences in subordinance between 
observers in subsequent intervals or in later encounters. Experi-
mental observers also displayed lower initial levels of dominant 
behaviors than controls, though the effect was only statistically 
significant in the second minute of the first encounter (Figure 
2c). There were no significant differences in subordinance be-
tween demonstrators paired with experimental or control ob-
servers (Figure 2b), but experimental demonstrators showed 
higher levels of dominance than controls (Figure 2d) during the 
second and third minutes of the first encounter, apparently in 
response to the initially higher level of subordinance displayed 
by experimental observers. As with the observer’s behavior, the 
effect on the demonstrator’s dominance was transient and no 
significant differences were apparent in later encounters.
In addition to win or lose information, exhibition encounters 
also provided information about the relative disparity between a 
demonstrator and his opponents. Observers could, therefore, have 
made more subtle, graded assessments of their relative status, in-
ferring the probable degree of difference in dominance between 
themselves and the demonstrator. To determine whether observ-
ers made use of this information, we calculated the difference in 
relative dominance for each demonstrator between the exhibition 
encounters he won and those he lost. We tested this measure as a 
predictor of observer subordinance during the first test encoun-
ter. Whereas there was a strong positive relationship for experi-
mental observers, there was no such relationship for control birds 
(Figure 3). These findings suggest that observers estimated the ac-
tual disparity in their dominance status relative to the demonstra-
tor, but only when they knew the losing opponent.
Figure 2: Mean dominance and subordinance indices for each of the first 
3 min of the first test session. a–d, Behavior of the observers (a, c) and the 
corresponding demonstrators (b, d); filled circles correspond to experimen-
tal birds, open circles to control birds. a, Experimental observers were sig-
nificantly more subordinate during the first minute than control observers 
(W+= 53, P = 0.026), but this effect disappeared after the first minute (W+ = 
41, P = 0.41). b, There were no significant differences in subordinate behavior 
between demonstrators paired with experimental or control observers (W+ 
≤ 47, P ≥ 0.12). c, Experimental observers displayed lower levels of dominant 
behaviors than controls, though the difference was only significant during the 
second minute of the first encounter (second: W+ = 53, P = 0.022; first and 
third: W+ ≤ 47, P ≥ 0.12). Because of their higher level of subordinate be-
havior in the first minute (a), relative social status (= dominance – subordi-
nance) was markedly lower for experimental observers during the first min-
ute of the first encounter (W+ = 54, P = 0.015). d, Demonstrators showed 
higher levels of dominance than controls, but the effect was significant only in 
the second and third minutes of the first encounter (first: W+ = 42, P = 0.34; 
second and third: W+ ≥ 52, P ≤ 0.039).
Figure 3: Subordinance index for observers during the first 5-min test en-
counter with the demonstrator. The subordinance index is a function of the 
mean difference in dominance between demonstrators and opponents dur-
ing the exhibition encounters. Experimental dyads are shown as filled cir-
cles with a continuous regression line; control dyads as open circles with a 
dashed regression line. There was a strong positive relationship (F1,5 = 26.64, 
P = 0.007, r2 = 0.87) for experimental birds, but none for control birds (F1,5 = 
1.55, P > 0.25, r2 = 0.28), and analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) indicated that 
the regression slopes for the two treatments were significantly different (F1,2 
= 8.01, P = 0.022).
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The results are fully in accord with the hypothesis that pin-
yon jays use transitive reasoning to make inferences of rela-
tive dominance. Jays that had previously interacted with one of 
the birds they observed drew inferences about their rank rela-
tive to the demonstrator, and showed a graded, quantitative re-
sponse based on their observations. Jays that observed very sim-
ilar interactions, but had never interacted directly with any of 
the birds they observed, failed to show either effect. This pattern 
rules out alternative general explanations, such as badges of sta-
tus 19 or dispositional responses to seeing another bird win or 
lose.15, 16, 17 This work constitutes a direct demonstration of tran-
sitive inference in social settings, and supports the hypothesis 
that social complexity provided a crucial context for the evolu-
tion of cognitive abilities.
Methods
Test procedures
To familiarize the birds with the apparatus, each jay was placed 
alone in one of the end compartments of the encounter chamber. After 
30 seconds the dividers were raised and the bird was allowed to explore 
the apparatus until it discovered and consumed a peanut. Each bird re-
ceived six such familiarization trials before beginning staged encounters. 
During staged encounters (Figure 1a), each member of a dyad was ini-
tially placed in one of the end chambers (randomly selected). After 10 
seconds the opaque divider was lifted, providing visual contact between 
dyad members through the second, transparent divider. After an addi-
tional 10 seconds the transparent divider was lifted, giving the birds si-
multaneous access to the central contest area. To facilitate recognition of 
individuals for video scoring, one of the dyad members in each encoun-
ter was marked on the wing primaries with water-soluble white paint. 
After the encounter the paint was removed.
Group formation and selection of pairs for testing
Our experimental design required sets of birds of relatively sim-
ilar rank who were unknown to each other, but whose relative domi-
nance could be predicted accurately. We first divided the birds into three 
groups; two groups of six birds and one group of four. The small size 
of the groups minimized the possibility of nonlinear relationships. Once 
the within-group hierarchies were established, we then determined 
eight of the 32 possible cross-group dominance relationships by pairing 
the second-, third- and fourth-ranked birds in group 1 with those of the 
same rank in group 2, and the second- and third-ranked birds in group 
3 with the second- and third-ranked birds in both groups 1 and 2. The 
outcomes of these within- and cross-groups dominance encounters were 
subsequently used to select sets of observers and demonstrators.
During exhibition sessions the demonstrator was paired with two 
other birds, one dominant and one subordinate to the demonstrator. In 
experimental conditions one of these other birds had to be a stranger to 
the observer and the other a known dominant. In control conditions both 
birds had to be strangers to the observer. In addition, because the exper-
imental design required birds that could both win and lose encounters 
with members of their group, birds at the top or bottom of their group hi-
erarchies were not used as observers. These constraints limited the num-
ber of possible pairings that could be generated, with the result that some 
individuals were used in more than one trial. Nine observers and six dem-
onstrators participated in the six experimental and six control pairings.
To control for prior experience in winning and losing, we arranged 
daily maintenance encounters between each of the demonstrators and 
observers and members of their own groups. During the three weeks 
before testing, each observer had an average of 15 encounters with five 
other birds, of which he won 47%; for the four observers that were tested 
more than once, at least two months passed between successive trials. In 
the same time period, each demonstrator had an average of 16 prior en-
counters with four other birds, of which he won 56%; for the three dem-
onstrators tested more than once, at least 10 days passed between suc-
cessive trials.
Behavioral indices
Because display behavior is often a more reliable indicator of domi-
nance than gaining access to food,20 we used relative frequencies of be-
havioral acts to assess dominance. To obtain an empirically valid index 
of relative dominance in which the contributions of the different behav-
ioral events were appropriately weighted, we first calculated (for each 
individual in each encounter) the difference between the raw counts of 
dominant and subordinate actions divided by their sum. Differences be-
tween dyad members in the value of this ratio, which weighted all action 
patterns equally, provided an initial approximate measure of relative 
dominance. From the 36 within-group dyads in the study, we extracted 
a set of 15 exemplars, dyads in which the mean of this ratio (averaged 
over all six encounters) was larger than 0.5 and in which one of the dyad 
members consistently dominated in all six encounters. Because some be-
haviors are better indicators of social status than others, however, a sim-
ple sum of event frequencies is often misleading as an indicator of rela-
tive dominance. To obtain a more sensitive measure, we subjected the 
raw counts from the last three encounters from each exemplar to canon-
ical discriminant analysis,18 which produces the weighted linear com-
bination of standardized variables that best distinguishes between data 
classes. In the final configuration, three variables—the frequencies of 
stare at and look away, and the sum of the frequencies of the three other 
submissive displays—were log-transformed, standardized and com-
bined into two weighted discriminant functions that constituted domi-
nance and subordinance indices. The difference between dominance and 
subordinance provided a direct measure of each individual’s relative so-
cial status (relative social status = dominance - subordinance), and in this 
combination the discriminant functions correctly categorized 93% of the 
encounters in the exemplar data set.
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